

A Brief History of “Silicon Valley Antitrust”

Antitrust and Silicon Valley: New Themes and Direction in Competition Law and Policy

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From Apple Orchards to Apple Park




Since My Graduation...

1980: Apple Computer goes public	1982: Sun Microsystems founded	1983: First portable PC (Compaq)
1984: Cisco Systems founded, Apple Macintosh and first ink-jet printer introduced	1985: Microsoft releases Windows 1.0 for MS-DOS	1989: Adobe releases Photoshop
1990: The Human Genome Project is launched; Intel has 90% market share in microprocessors	1991: World Wide Web debuts	1994: Yahoo! is founded
1995: Netscape Navigator 2.0 released	1997: Steve Jobs returns to Apple	1999: Microsoft becomes the most valued company in the world
2001: PayPal is formed—and acquired by eBay in 2002	2004: Google goes public; Facebook moves to Silicon Valley	2006: Tesla Motors introduces the Tesla Roadster
2007: Apple releases the iPhone	2012: Facebook goes public	2018: Apple is valued at \$1 trillion

A Natural Antitrust Hotbed

- Silicon Valley antitrust issues are important because of the outsized influence that this small area has on the worldwide economy.
- Tech markets lend themselves to “lock-out” strategies—that lend themselves to competitor-driven antitrust litigation.
- Many tech industries are consumer-facing, lending themselves to consumer class actions.
- Tech is cool.

Government Scrutiny



So What is “Silicon Valley Antitrust”?

Some Defining Cases and Moments

Not all of which appear to be “high-tech” cases

Kodak

(SCOTUS 1992)

IP Guidelines

(1995)

Microsoft II

(1998 DOJ action)

EC Microsoft

(2004)

***FTC v. Rambus &
DOJ VITA Bus. Rev.***

USTR iPhone

(2013)

Microsoft/LinkedIn

(EC 2016)

**EC Google Shopping
Case**

***Cartes Bancaires &
American Express***

Some Defining Issues and Concepts

**Antitrust Limits
on Intellectual
Property Rights**

**Standard Setting
and its Potential
Abuse**

**Interoperability,
Technological
Tying**

**Closed Systems
and System
Competition**

**Network Effects
as a Source of
Durable Market
Power**

**Innovation in
Market Power
and Effects
Analysis**

**User Data in
Antitrust
Analysis**

Antitrust and IP

Are IP rights really “just another form of personal property”?

- The 1995 IP Guidelines – most IP licensing is procompetitive.
- *Illinois Tool* eliminates the inference of market power from IP rights.
- *Kodak*, *Xerox* and *Data General* debate refusals to share IP rights – but then are mooted by *Trinko*.
- Convergence around the principle that conduct *within* the IP grant is not an antitrust violation, but leveraging IP beyond IP grant may be.

Anticompetitive Standard Setting

Rambus Set Limits; VITA Opens Door to Ex Ante License Terms

- Broad consensus that standard setting is ordinarily procompetitive.
- But, patents that read on mandatory standards become much more powerful.
- FTC holds in *Dell* and *Rambus* that concealment of patent right to an SSO, depriving a “design around” opportunity, is exclusionary conduct.
- DOJ VITA Business Review letter OK’s *ex ante* agreements on most restrictive terms in FRAND licenses.

Misusing Standard Essential Patents

The near-worldwide rule against injunctions based on SEPs

- In 2013, Apple convinces the DOJ Antitrust Division and then the USTR that injunctions based on FRAND-encumbered SEPs are anticompetitive.
 - The USTR declines to enforce an exclusion order Samsung obtained on iPhones.
- In 2015, the EU's High Court's *Huawei v. ZTE* decision finds that seeking injunctions with SEPs may constitute abuse of dominance.
- The DOJ now says this is not an antitrust issue, and *hold-out* is a more serious issue than *hold-up*.

Interoperability and Technological Tying

From IBM to Microsoft and Tyco Health

- The 1970s *IBM* cases were the legal prelude to a cases concerning refusals to provide interfaces, integrating previously separate products, and creating deliberate incompatibilities.
- The EC's 2004 *Microsoft* decision holds that declining to supply previously available interface information is an abuse of dominance.
- US law remains skeptical of such claims because of "forced sharing."
 - *E.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances v. Tyco Health Care Group* (9th Cir. 2010), which makes an improved (but not shared) interface a defense.

Closed Systems and Systems Competition

Kodak, yes, but what else?

- Commentators such as Tim Wu and Jonathan Zittrain would say that “closed systems” present the most important antitrust issue in the New Economy.
- Yet “systems competition” is commonplace in high-tech markets, *e.g.*, iOS v. Android, competing cellular networks.
- *Kodak* (1992) accepted the possibility of “aftermarket monopolies” by closing-down product system (*e.g.*, copiers and parts), but these cases rarely succeed.
- Save for *U.S. v. AT&T* (1980), antitrust has never forced open an originally closed system.

Network Effects and Market Power

An enduring legacy of Microsoft II

- *Microsoft II* rested largely on the idea that, due to network effects, the “applications barrier to entry” protected Microsoft’s OS monopoly.
- This is now a standard consideration in many high-tech markets, *e.g.*:
 - Platforms (*e.g.*, operating systems and video game consoles)
 - Social media (*e.g.*, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Reddit, LinkedIn)
 - Communication networks (*e.g.*, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, iMessage)
 - Formats and protocols (*e.g.*, video and optical disc formats)
 - Marketplaces (*e.g.*, Amazon, Uber, Airbnb, OpenTable)

Innovation in Assessing Market Power

Neither “disruptive competition” nor “innovation markets” take flight

- 25 years ago, economists argued that Schumpeterian “dynamic competition” models were more suited to high-tech markets than prevailing static models.
 - In practice, this counseled for markets to “police themselves.”
 - Dynamic competition as a market power defense hardly ever works.
- In 1995, the *IP Guidelines* introduced “innovation markets” encompassing “the research and development directed to particular new or improved goods.”
 - Innovation concerns and future products are important in many merger reviews, but there has never been a “pure” innovation market challenge.

User Data in Antitrust Analysis

A key issue that may come to define Silicon Valley antitrust

- A defining feature of many new markets is the amassing of huge stores of consumer information that can be “mined” for various purposes.
- So far, the key antitrust cases on “Big Data” have voiced concerns, but cleared the deals, *e.g.*, *Google/DoubleClick* and *Microsoft/LinkedIn*.
- The German FCO’s Facebook case is a milestone:
 - *Charge*: Facebook’s practice of collecting, using and **merging** data in user accounts constituted an abuse of dominance.
 - Clear intrusion into data privacy law, which (especially under GDPR) normally determines what firms can do with user data.

Looking Forward

- How will the German FCO's Facebook case come out?
- Will there ever be a direct, gov't challenge to a "closed system"?
 - Highly unlikely in the U.S., but in Europe or Asia?
- Will we ever see an enforcement action that must stand or fall in innovation markets or on innovation effects?
- What do we make of the current populist attack on Silicon Valley power?

Thank you