Chapter 9
Copyright Protection for Works of Foreign Origin

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9.1 Introduction

Copyright law is premised on the principle of territoriality, under which a nation’s intellectual property laws apply only to conduct occurring within its own borders. With globalization, of course, it has long been necessary for nations to make arrangements with each other to accommodate the flow of information and copyrighted works across international borders. The gradual evolution of United States law to provide copyright protection for works of foreign origin illustrates some of the challenges still presented by the continuing globalization of copyright law.

For the first hundred years of its existence, the United States did not provide any copyright protection to works of foreign origin. When it finally agreed to extend such protection on a reciprocal basis, questions arose regarding how existing requirements, such as the requirement of copyright notice, applied to works first published abroad. An ambiguity in the 1909 Copyright Act exacerbated the difficulty, resulting in uncertainty that persists today regarding works first published abroad prior to 1978. As illustrated by a recent case, this uncertainty can result in copyright

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1 See 2 Sam Ricketson and Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighboring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond §20.15 at 1301 (2d ed. 2005) (It is “a widely held concept of international copyright law . . . that there is not international copyright law as such, but rather a collection of national copyright laws.”); Paul Goldstein, International Copyright Law §3.1.2. at 65 (2001) (“Territoriality, the principle that a country’s prescriptive competence ends at its borders, is the dominating norm in international copyright cases.”).
2 See notes 6–33 and accompanying text.
3 See notes 34–49 and accompanying text.
4 See notes 50–102 and accompanying text.

terms that differ by as much as one hundred years depending on how the ambiguity is resolved.5

9.2 1790–1908

When the U.S. enacted its first Copyright Act in 1790, it specifically provided that copyrights would only be granted to “citizens or residents” of the United States:

> [T]he author or authors of any map, chart, book or books..., being a citizen or citizens of these United States, or resident therein,...shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending such map, chart, book or books... 6

At the time, of course, every nation that had a copyright statute offered protection only to its own citizens or residents.7 There was no point in granting an exclusive right to citizens or residents of other nations; doing so would harm the balance of trade by increasing the royalty payments that would flow to foreign authors and publishers.8 It was therefore very much in the national interest to restrict copyright to a nation’s own citizens and residents. But just to make sure that the effect of that restriction was absolutely clear, the Copyright Act of 1790 added the following proviso:

> Nothing in this act shall be construed... to prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting, or publishing within the United States, of any map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any person not a citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of the United States.9

As the U.S. was primarily an English-speaking country, the principal effect of this restriction was that books by British authors could be freely copied and disseminated in the U.S., which provided U.S. citizens and residents with a large quantity of reading material at cheap prices.10 The restriction of copyright protection to U.S. citizens and residents was carried forward in the Copyright Act of 1831.11

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5 See notes 103–124 and accompanying text.
6 Copyright Act of 1790, c. 15, §1, 1 Stat. 124.
7 See 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 1, §1.20 at 19 (“unauthorized reproduction and use of foreign works... [continued] for a considerable period after the adoption of national copyright laws by most countries. ... [W]hile protecting the works of their national authors, [most countries] did not regard the unauthorized exploitation of foreign works as either unfair or immoral.”).
8 Cf. 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 1, §1.22 at 21.
9 Copyright Act of 1790, c. 15, §5, 1 Stat. 125.
11 Copyright Act of 1831, c. 16, §1, 4 Stat. 436 (“[A]ny person or persons, being a citizen or citizens of these United States, or resident therein, who shall be the author or authors of any book, books, map, chart, or musical composition, ... or who shall invent, design, etch, engrave, [or] work... any print or engraving, shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting,
Beginning in the 1820s, however, European nations began to enter into bilateral treaties on the basis of mutual reciprocity. This arrangement would benefit both nations if the balance of trade in copyrighted works between them was relatively equal. Later, in 1852, France decided to unilaterally offer copyright protection in France to all authors, regardless of nationality or domicile, in the hope that it would encourage other countries to grant similar protection to French authors. This move eventually led to the adoption in 1886 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, under which member nations agreed to provide copyright protection to the citizens and residents of other member nations on the basis of “national treatment,” meaning that each nation would provide copyright protection to the citizens of other Berne nations on terms that were no less favorable than those it provided to its own citizens.

The United States sent an observer to the diplomatic conference that adopted the Berne Convention, but it chose not to become a member of the Berne Union for more than a hundred years. There were a number of reasons for this extraordinary delay. First, in the beginning it was simply not in the national interest to offer copyright protection to foreign citizens. At the time, the U.S. produced very few copyrighted works that would be of interest to readers in other nations, so the economic benefit it would have received from a reciprocal

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9 Copyright Protection for Works of Foreign Origin

12 See 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 1, §§1.29–1.31 at 27–32, 40.
13 See Decree of March 28, 1852 (Fr.); 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 1, §1.24 at 22; Goldstein, supra note 1, §2.1.1. at 17.
14 See 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 1, §§2.05–2.52 at 44–83.
15 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 2 (“Authors who are subjects or citizens of any of the countries of the Union...shall enjoy in the other countries for their works...the rights which the respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to natives.”). The most recent revision of the Berne Convention provides for national treatment in Art. 5. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Text, July 24, 1971, art. 5 (“Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals.”).
16 See 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 1, §2.39 at 74–75, §2.51 at 82.
17 See Goldstein, supra note 1, §2.1.2.1 at 23 (“The United States was the single, commercially most important country to remain outside the Berne Union for its entire first century.”). The United States eventually adhered to the Berne Convention effective March 1, 1989. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Contracting Parties, Berne Convention, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
arrangement was very small; and the cost to the balance of payments, in terms of the royalties that would have flowed overseas, would have been very high. It therefore very much remained in the national interest that U.S. citizens would continue to have a supply of reading material at cheap prices, regardless of the diplomatic cost of foreign authors complaining about U.S. "piracy." Thus, for most of the 19th Century, the U.S. chose to remain what China is today: the biggest "pirate" of copyrighted works in the world.

Second, even when trade in copyrighted works began to even out, U.S. law had a number of features which were incompatible with membership in the Berne Convention. For example, because U.S. law was based primarily on a utilitarian theory of copyright, under which copyright is offered as a financial incentive to encourage authors and publishers to create and disseminate new works of authorship, it made little sense to offer copyright protection to an author (or publisher) unless that author affirmatively claimed that he or she wanted the benefit of copyright protection; otherwise, the government was simply giving away a right to royalties without receiving anything in return. Thus, U.S. law had always required formalities, such as registration and notice, as a condition of copyright protection. But because European countries were influenced more by author's rights theories of copyright, under which an author has a natural right to the economic fruits of his or her creative labor, the 1908 revision of the Berne Convention prohibited the imposition of any formalities as a condition of copyright protection. For similar reasons, the delegates that adopted the Berne Convention recommended the adoption of a minimum duration of

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18 See United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260, 264 (1908) (“in 1802, there was little ground to anticipate the publication of American works abroad. As late as 1820 Sydney Smith, in the Edinburgh Review, made his famous exclamation, ‘In the four quarters of the globe, who reads an American book?’ ”).  
19 Cf. Goldstein, supra note 1, §2.3 at 47 (“International copyright and international trade are inherently linked. Any time one country undertakes . . . to protect works originating in another country, it makes at least implicitly a calculation of the decision’s implications for the balance of trade.”).  
20 Cf. Briggs, supra note 10, at 47 (with regard to the United States, “little can be expected from the pressure of external interest, for America’s capacity for self-support, due mainly to its geographic position, gives it the power in many matters to dictate its own terms.”).  
21 Thus, the 1790 Copyright Act was titled “An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.” 1 Stat. 124. See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).  
22 Cf. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 663–64 (1834) (“when the legislature are about to vest an exclusive right in an author or inventor, they have the power to prescribe the conditions on which such right shall be enjoyed; and . . . no one can avail himself of such right who does not substantially comply with the requisitions of the law.”).  
23 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Berlin Text, Nov. 13, 1908, art. 4 (“The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality.”);
Copyright Protection for Works of Foreign Origin

30 years after the death of the author, which was usually much longer than the then-maximum U.S. duration of 42 years after first publication. In the 1908 revision of the Berne Convention, a minimum duration of 50 years after the death of the author was recommended, and that minimum duration was made mandatory in 1948. As a result, the U.S. could not join the Berne Convention until it was willing to make major changes in its fundamental approach to copyright protection.

Throughout the 19th Century, foreign authors (British authors in particular) regularly petitioned Congress to extend copyright protection to foreigners, but those pleas fell on deaf ears. Thus, the Copyright Act of 1870 carried forward the limitation that only U.S. citizens or residents were eligible for copyright protection. It was not until the United States could boast of some authors of international prominence that it finally became in the national interest to extend copyright protection to citizens of other nations on a reciprocal basis. Those U.S. authors who could reasonably expect to earn royalties from publication of their works overseas added their voices to the chorus of foreign authors clamoring for some kind of international copyright protection in the United States. In addition, even U.S. authors whose works were only popular domestically were tired of competing for business with cheap imports from Great Britain. Finally, in 1891, the U.S. adopted the Chace Act, which extended copyright protection to citizens and residents of foreign nations when those nations agreed to provide copyright protection to U.S. citizens and residents:

Goldstein, supra note 1, §2.1.2.1 at 23 ("Political pressure to retain formalities..., which were prohibited since 1908 by the Berlin Text, was one reason the United States declined to join Berne.").

26 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Berlin Text, Nov. 15, 1908, art. 7.
27 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Brussels Text, June 26, 1948, art. 7(1).
30 Among the prominent U.S. authors who lobbied Congress for an international copyright bill were James Fenimore Cooper, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Washington Irving, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Walt Whitman, John Greenleaf Whittier, and Mark Twain. See Bowker, supra note 28, at 347, 355, 359; W.E. Simonds, International Copyright (Report of the House Committee on Patents), in Putnam, supra note 28, at 145–47.
31 See Briggs, supra note 10, at 98–99.
Provided further, That this act shall only apply to a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation when such foreign state or nation permits to [U.S.] citizens...the benefit of copyright [by national treatment], or when such foreign state or nation is a party to an international agreement which provides for reciprocity in the granting of copyright [to which the U.S. is also a party].

As a direct result of the Chace Act, the U.S. quickly entered into reciprocal copyright agreements with its major European trading partners, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.

But even though a major barrier had been breached, the U.S. still made it difficult for foreign authors to obtain copyright protection in the United States. First, in a blatant protectionist measure, the U.S. simultaneously adopted the so-called “manufacturing clause,” which provided that in order to obtain copyright protection in the U.S., foreign works had to be printed from plates manufactured or type set in the United States. This requirement was gradually relaxed over the years, but in some form it was retained as a part of U.S. copyright law until 1986.

Second, the U.S. still required foreign authors to comply with the formalities imposed by U.S. law. One of these formalities was the condition that the work be registered in the United States before it was published anywhere in the world. Thus, a foreign author who published a work in his or her domestic market before thinking about doing so in the United States irrevocably lost the opportunity to obtain copyright protection here. Another one of these formalities, dating back to 1802, was the requirement that copyright notice be inserted in all published copies of the work. Thus, the 1870 Copyright Act required that:

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34 See Act of March 3, 1891, c. 565, §3, 26 Stat. 1107, codified at Rev. Stat. §4956 (“Provided, That in the case of a book, photograph, chromo, or lithograph, the two [deposit] copies...shall be printed from type set within the limits of the United States, or from plates made therefrom, or from negatives, or drawings on stone made within the limits of the United States, or from transfers made therefrom. During the existence of such copyright the importation into the United States of any book, chromo, lithograph or photograph, so copyrighted, or any edition or editions thereof, or any plates of the same not made within the limits of the United States, shall be, and is hereby prohibited [with certain exceptions].”).
36 Act of March 3, 1891, c. 565, §3, 26 Stat. 1107, codified at Rev. Stat. §4956 (“No person shall be entitled to a copyright unless he shall, on or before the day of publication in this or any foreign country, deliver at the office of the Librarian of Congress...a printed copy of the title of the [work]...for which he desires a copyright, no unless he shall also, not later than the day of publication thereof in this or any foreign country, deliver at the office of the Librarian of Congress...two copies of such [work].”).
37 See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, c. 36, §1, 2 Stat. 171.
No person shall maintain an action for infringement of his copyright unless he shall give notice thereof by inserting in the several copies of every edition published...the following words, viz.: "Entered according to act of Congress, in the year ______, by A.B., in the office of the librarian of Congress, at Washington."  

In 1874, an amendment allowed the simplified short form of the notice that is familiar to us today: the word "Copyright," the date of first publication, and the name of the author or copyright claimant. Failure to include the copyright notice on published copies meant than an author forfeited any U.S. copyright protection for his or her work.

The notice requirement was retained without discussion when copyright was extended to foreign authors in 1891. This immediately led to a question of interpretation: was copyright notice required only when the work was published in the United States? Or did an author also have to include a copyright notice when the work was published outside the United States, at the risk of losing his or her copyright protection?

When the question finally reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1908, the Court, in *United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co.*, held that notice was only required on copies published in the United States: "We are satisfied that the statute does not require notice of the American copyright on books published abroad and sold only for use there." Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes reasoned that "it is unlikely that [Congress] would make requirements of personal action beyond the sphere of its control...[or] that it would require a warning to the public against the infrac-...tion of a law beyond the jurisdiction where that law was in force." The court also noted that when the notice requirement was added in 1802, international copyright relations did not exist. "If a publication without notice of an American copyright did not affect the copyright before the days when it was possible to get an English copyright also, it is not to be supposed that Congress, by arranging with England for that possibility, gave a new meaning to the old [statute], increasing the burden of American authors, and attempted to intrude its requirements into any notice that might be [required] by the English law."
Although the *United Dictionary* decision resolved an important question under U.S. law, it bears emphasizing that the scope of that opinion was limited. Before 1978, a work was protected by a state common-law copyright before it was published;\(^{44}\) once it was published, the state common-law copyright expired, and unless a federal statutory copyright was obtained, the work entered the public domain.\(^{45}\) In *United Dictionary*, the work in question was first published in the United States with a proper copyright notice, and the plaintiff took all the necessary steps to obtain a federal statutory copyright, before a revised version of the work was subsequently published in England without notice.\(^{46}\) The question, therefore, was whether the lack of notice in the English edition divested the plaintiff of a federal statutory copyright which it had obtained in the United States.\(^{47}\) In the more usual case, however, a work is first published abroad without notice, and only later is it published in the United States. In such a situation, the relevant authorities were clear: if the work was published anywhere in the world (with or without notice) before being registered in the United States, the work lost its common-law copyright, thereby placing it in the public domain and rendering it permanently ineligible for a federal statutory copyright.\(^{48}\) Because British law required first publication in Great

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\(^{44}\) See, e.g., *Wheaton v. Peters*, 33 U.S. 591, 657 (1834) (“That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, and may obtain redress against anyone who deprives him of it, or by improperly obtaining a copy endeavours to realise a profit by its publication, cannot be doubted; but this is a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the author shall have published it to the world.”); *Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co.*, 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909) (“At common law an author had a property in his manuscript, and might have an action against anyone who undertook to publish it without authority.”).

\(^{45}\) See, e.g., *Caliga*, 215 U.S. at 188 (“At common law, the exclusive right to copy existed in the author until he permitted a general publication. Thus, when a book was published in print, the owner’s common-law right was lost.”); *Tribune Co. of Chicago v. Associated Press*, 116 F. 126, 126 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1900) (“Literary property is protected at common law to the extent only of possession and use of the manuscript and its first publication by the owner. ... With voluntary publication the exclusive right is determined at common law, and the statutory copyright is the sole dependence of the author or owner for a monopoly in the future publication.”).

\(^{46}\) 208 U.S. at 263. The facts are more clearly stated in the Court of Appeals opinion, which states that the work was first published simultaneously in the United States and England on Aug. 9, 1892; and that the work “was subsequently published commercially in England under an agreement ... entered into on July 18, 1894.” *G. & C. Merriam Co. v. United Dictionary Co.*, 146 F. 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1906), aff’d, 208 U.S. 260 (1908). The court noted that there was “an exact and literal compliance with the United States statute in regard to all books published or circulated by or with the consent of [the plaintiff] in the United States,” id., and that the two editions were identical except for the first 3 and last 34 pages, id. at 355, 359.

\(^{47}\) 208 U.S. at 263 (“The question is whether omission of notice of the American copyright from the English publication, with the assent of the appellee, destroyed its rights.”).

\(^{48}\) See Eaton S. Drone, *A Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions in Great Britain and the United States* 295–96 (1879) (“there can be no doubt that ... an author forfeits his claim to copyright in this country by a first, but not by a contemporaneous, publication of his work abroad.”); *Tribune Co.*, 116 F. at 128 (“As the exclusive right of publication at common law
Britain, the result was that publishers had to publish works simultaneously in Great Britain and the United States in order to obtain copyright in both countries.\footnote{9}

\textbf{9.3 1909–1978}

To complicate the matter further for foreign authors, one year after United \textit{Dictionary} Congress adopted the 1909 Copyright Act, which contained language that reintroduced an ambiguity in the question of whether some foreign copies had to bear copyright notice. Prior to the 1909 Act, copyright protection was secured initially by registering the work (before publication) with the Copyright Office;\footnote{50} only after obtaining copyright protection by registration did the requirement of placing notice on published copies begin.\footnote{51} But under the 1909 Act, it was the act of publication with proper copyright notice that invested copyright protection in the first place. Section 9 of the 1909 Act provided:

\begin{quote}
Any person entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this title; and such notice shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the United States by authority of the copyright proprietor\ldots\footnote{52}
\end{quote}

The second clause of section 9 was consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in the \textit{United Dictionary} case: after copyright protection was secured, it was clear that only copies of the work published in the U.S. had to bear copyright notice; and if copies of the work without notice were published in a foreign country after U.S. copyright protection was secured, it would not divest the copyright owner of his or her U.S. copyright.

But if that proposition was clear, it was now unclear what steps needed to be taken in order to secure U.S. copyright protection initially. If a work was published initially in a foreign country with whom the United States had treaty relations, did the work have to bear a U.S. copyright notice in order to secure federal copyright protection? If so, did the initial publication in that foreign country without proper notice place the work in the public domain, thereby forfeiting the right to subsequently obtain a federal statutory protection with the publication in London, no protection then exists beyond that expressly given by the statute.”).\footnote{49} See Briggs, \textit{supra} note 10, at 93–94; George Haven Putnam, \textit{Analysis of the Provisions of the Copyright Law of 1891}, in Putnam, \textit{supra} note 28, at 177; Tribune Co., 116 F. at 128 (“Before the amendment authorizing copyright in America on foreign publications, under prescribed conditions where the publication is simultaneous, such foreign property was left unprotected.”) (emphasis added).\footnote{52} See note 36, \textit{supra}.\footnote{50} See note 38, \textit{supra}.\footnote{51} Copyright Act of 1909, c. 320, §9, 35 Stat. 1077 (renumbered §10 in 1947, repealed 1978).
Or was the foreign publication without notice simply to be ignored, as if it had never occurred? Alternatively, was mere publication of the work in that foreign country, without any notice at all, sufficient to secure U.S. copyright protection for the foreign work? Or did the work have to be republished in the United States with proper copyright notice (as the manufacturing clause seemingly required) in order to obtain U.S. copyright protection?

The proper interpretation of section 9 was made even more cloudy by the legislative history of the 1909 Act. As initially drafted, section 9 read as follows:

Any person entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof in the United States with the notice of copyright required by this title; and such notice shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale by authority of the copyright proprietor.

As initially drafted, the statute was relatively clear: a work had to be published in the United States with proper copyright notice in order to obtain a federal statutory copyright, and notice had to be inserted in each published copy; there was nothing to suggest that the notice requirement did not apply to copies published outside the United States. In the final version, however, the phrase “in the United States” was moved from the first clause to the second. “This change made it clear that a work duly copyrighted in the United States did not lose protection merely because

53 This view was taken in Basevi v. Edward O’Toole Co., 26 F. Supp. 41, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (“publication of a book ... in a foreign country without notice of United States copyright thereon, will prevent the owner of the book from subsequently securing a valid copyright thereof in the United States.”). See also Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 212 F. 301, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (“Because, therefore, there was a publication in Europe before registration [or publication] in the United States, the bill [alleging infringement] must be dismissed.”), aff’d on other grounds, 218 F. 511 (2nd Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704 (1914); American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 833 (2d Cir. 1922) (“Publication of an intellectual production without copyrighting it causes the work to fall into the public domain. It becomes by such publication dedicated to the public, and any person is therefore entitled to publish it for his own benefit.”).

54 This view was taken in Italian Book Co. v. Cardilli, 273 F. 619, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (“publication in Italy [with reservation of rights in Italian but without U.S. copyright notice] ... did not prevent the subsequent American copyright, if (as is the case here) there had been no publication in the United States prior to that of the copyright owner.”).

55 See Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946), discussed infra at notes 61–68 and accompanying text.

56 See Twin Books v. Walt Disney Co., 83 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996), discussed infra at notes 80–96 and accompanying text. For yet a further view, taking the position that the initial publication of the work had to occur in the United States, see Arthur W. Weil, American Copyright Law 273–76 (1917); but see Richard C. DeWolf, An Outline of Copyright Law 38 (1925) (disagreeing with Weil on this point).

57 The original draft is quoted in Herbert G. Howell, The Copyright Law 73 (2d ed. 1948), and in 2 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright, §6:44, at 6–56 (2007).
Copyright Protection for Works of Foreign Origin

there might be an edition subsequently published abroad without notice,\textsuperscript{58} as the \textit{United Dictionary} case had held; but it also suggested that a work did not have to be published in the United States in order to obtain U.S. copyright protection. Thus, publication \textit{with} notice outside the United States, in a country with whom the United States had treaty relations, was therefore now deemed sufficient to obtain a U.S. copyright.\textsuperscript{59} But ambiguity remained with respect to the effect of an initial publication outside the United States \textit{without} a proper copyright notice.\textsuperscript{60}

When the issue reached the Second Circuit in 1954, the court split on the proper interpretation of Section 9. In \textit{Heim v. Universal Pictures Co.},\textsuperscript{61} the work at issue, a popular song, was first published in Hungary in 1935, but the copyright notice stated that the date of first publication was 1936 (the date that the work was registered and first published in the United States as part of a Hungarian motion picture).\textsuperscript{62} Under U.S. law, notice with an incorrect date was tantamount to publication without any notice at all.\textsuperscript{63} Nonetheless, the majority held that the error was immaterial:

We construe the statute, as to publication in a foreign country by a foreign author . . . not to require, as a condition of obtaining or maintaining a valid American copyright, that any notice be affixed to any copies whatever published in such foreign country, regardless of whether publication first occurred in that country or here, or whether it occurred before or after registration here.

It seems to be suggested by some text-writers that . . . where publication abroad precedes publication here, the first copy published abroad must have affixed to it the notice described . . . Such a requirement would achieve no practical purpose, for a notice given by a single copy would obviously give notice to virtually no one. . . .\textsuperscript{[T]he most practicable and, as we think, the correct interpretation, is that publication abroad will in all cases be enough, provided that, under the laws of the country where it takes place, it does not result in putting the work in the public domain.}\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{58} Patry, supra note 57, §6:44, at 6–56.
\textsuperscript{59} See DeWolf, supra note 56, at 38 ("it seems probable, at least, that publication in a foreign country with the statutory notice is sufficient to initiate copyright protection, even if it takes place in advance of publication in the United States.").
\textsuperscript{60} A leading treatise published in 1938 took the view that "no person is entitled to claim statutory copyright under the Act, unless, when first publishing the work abroad or in the United States, he has affixed the statutory notice." 2 Stephen P. Ladas, The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property §324 at 698 (1938).
\textsuperscript{61} 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
\textsuperscript{62} Id. at 481.
\textsuperscript{63} More precisely, if the date in the notice was \textit{later} than the actual date of first publication or registration, then the notice and the copyright were invalid, because the error would have had the effect of lengthening the term of the copyright; but if the date in the notice was \textit{earlier} than the actual date of first publication or registration, then the error did not affect the validity of the copyright, but only shortened its duration. See Callahan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 657–58 (1888); American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 836 (2d Cir. 1922); Baker v. Taylor, 2 Fed. Cas. 478, 478–49 (No. 782) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1848).
\textsuperscript{64} 154 F.2d at 486–87.
The majority nonetheless affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that no copying had occurred. Concurring in the result, Judge Clark criticized the majority for upholding the validity of the copyright:

The opinion holds that American copyright is secured by publication abroad without the notice of copyright admittedly required for publication here. This novel conclusion, suggested here for the first time, seems to me impossible in the face of the statutory language.

Neither opinion focused on the specific language of the relevant treaty between the United States and Hungary, which stated:

The enjoyment and exercise of the rights secured by the present Convention are subject to the performance of the conditions and formalities prescribed by the laws and regulations of the country where protection is claimed under the present Convention.

Although this language could be considered a mere tautology, it is more likely that it was intended to require that Hungarian citizens comply with the same formalities with which U.S. authors were required to comply.

After the Heim decision, the U.S. Copyright Office began to accept copyright registrations for works that had first been published outside the United States without notice under its “rule of doubt,” although it continued to instruct foreign authors to include notice when publishing their works abroad. However, after the United States adhered to the Universal Copyright Convention in 1955, the Copyright Office reversed course and adopted a regulation providing that published copies had to bear copyright

65 Id. at 488.
66 Id. at 488 (Clark, J., concurring).
68 After a comprehensive review of the statute and other relevant authorities (not including the United States – Hungary Copyright Convention), a prominent copyright practitioner reluctantly reached the conclusion that “the copyright law, as currently drafted, require[s] notice of copyright in works [first] published abroad.” See Arthur S. Katz, Is Notice of Copyright Necessary in Works Published Abroad? A Query and a Quandary, 1953 Wash. U. L.Q. 55, 87.
69 See Abraham L. Kaminstein, ©: Key to Universal Copyright Protection, in Theodore R. Kupferman & Mathew Foner, eds., Universal Copyright Convention Analyzed 23, 32 (1955). Under the “rule of doubt,” “no claim should be disapproved if an Examiner has a reasonable doubt about the ultimate action which might be taken under the same circumstances by an appropriate court.” Id. at 32 n. 18.
70 See U.S. Copyright Office, Form A-B (Foreign), quoted in Katz, supra note 68, at 87 n. 98 (“Publish the work with the statutory notice of copyright. . . . After publication with the notice of copyright, . . . send all the required items to the Register of Copyrights.”). In addition, it should be noted that many of the then-existing bilateral treaties specifically required compliance with U.S. formalities as a condition of bilateral protection. See Katz, supra note 68, at 80; George D. Cary, The United States and Universal Copyright: An Analysis of Public Law 743, in Kupferman & Foner, supra note 69, at 83, 93 & n. 21.
notice even if the work was first published outside the United States.\textsuperscript{71} The Office reasoned that otherwise, the notice requirement of the U.C.C. (which provided that all formalities were deemed to be satisfied if the work was published with proper copyright notice\textsuperscript{72}) would be rendered a nullity.\textsuperscript{73} This requirement is carried forward for pre-1978 works in the current Copyright Office Regulations.\textsuperscript{74}

\subsection*{9.4 1978 to the Present}

In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress dramatically changed the requirements for obtaining federal copyright protection. Instead of requiring publication with notice, the 1976 Act provided that a federal statutory copyright would arise as soon as a work was \textquotedblleft fixed in any tangible medium of expression.\textquotedblright\textsuperscript{75} At the same time, however, Congress not only retained the notice requirement for published copies, but it also unambiguously extended the notice requirement to all copies of the work, published anywhere in the world. As enacted, Section 401 of the 1976 Act stated:

\begin{quote}
Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright as provided
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{71} See 37 C.F.R. §202.2(a)(3) (1959) (\textquotedblleft Works first published abroad, other than works eligible for ad interim registration, must bear an adequate copyright notice at the time of their first publication in order to secure copyright under the law of the United States.	extquotedblright), in 24 Fed. Reg. 4956.

\textsuperscript{72} See Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, Art. III(1) (\textquotedblleft Any Contracting State which, under its domestic law, requires as a condition of copyright, compliance with formalities...shall regard these requirements as satisfied with respect to all works protected in accordance with this Convention, and first published outside its territory and the author of which is not one of its nationals, if from the time of first publication all the copies of the work published with the authority of the author or other copyright proprietor bear the symbol © accompanied by the name of the copyright proprietor and the year of first publication placed in such a manner and location as to give reasonable notice of claim of copyright.	extquotedblright).

\textsuperscript{73} See George D. Cary, Proposed New Copyright Office Regulations, 6 Bull. Copyr. Soc’y USA 213, 213 (1959) (regulation \textquotedblleft is intended to make clear that the Office no longer considers the dictum in the [Hein] case...as controlling its action...[because] the subsequent enactment of the so-called ‘U.C.C. amendments’ to the copyright law in effect amounted to a Congressional expression, contrary to the dictum, that foreign works, in order to obtain the benefit of U.S. copyright law, must, at the time of first publication, contain the form of notice provided for in the U.C.C.	extquotedblright). See also Kaminstein, supra note 69, at 33; George D. Cary, The United States and Universal Copyright: An Analysis of Public Law 743, in Kuperfman & Foner, supra note 69, at 83, 91–94. The author agrees with this analysis; but it should be noted that two respected commentators have concluded otherwise. See 2 Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer on Copyright, §7.12[D][2][a], at 7–105 to 7–106 (2007); 1 Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright §3.7.2, at 3:114 (3rd ed. 2005).

\textsuperscript{74} See 37 C.F.R. §202.2(a)(3) (2007) (“Works first published abroad before January 1, 1978, other than works for which ad interim copyright has been obtained, must have borne an adequate copyright notice. The adequacy of the copyright notice for such works is determined by the copyright statute as it existed on the date of first publication abroad.”).

\textsuperscript{75} 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
by this section shall be placed on publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.76

It was not until March 1, 1989, the effective date of U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention, that the notice requirement was finally made optional rather than mandatory, by changing the word “shall” to the word “may.”77

Thus, for works published on or after January 1, 1978 (the effective date of the 1976 Act),78 it has been clear what the effect of publication without notice in a foreign country is on the federal statutory copyright in the United States. Ambiguity remains, however, regarding works first published abroad before January 1, 1978; and since some copyrights obtained under the 1909 Act will remain in effect until at least December 31, 2072,79 we have another 65 years to go before we can declare the ambiguity to be no longer material. It is important, therefore, to consider the subsequent history of the 1909 Act in the courts.

In Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co.,80 the work at issue was the children’s book *Bambi, A Life in the Woods*, written by an Austrian citizen, Felix Salten.81 *Bambi* was written in German and was first published in Germany in 1923 without any copyright notice.82 In 1926, *Bambi* was republished in Germany with U.S. copyright notice, and the work was registered in the U.S. in 1927.83 In 1954, the copyright was renewed by Salten’s heir.84 The question presented was straightforward: when did U.S. copyright protection for *Bambi* commence? If U.S. copyright protection commenced in 1923, when the work was first published in Germany, then the 1954 renewal came too late, because the work had entered the public domain in 1951 when its first 28-year term expired.85 But if U.S. copyright

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79 See 17 U.S.C. §304(a) (providing for an initial term of 28 years and a renewal term of 67 years, for a maximum duration of 95 years from the date of first publication).
80 83 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996).
81 Id. at 1164.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Under the 1909 Act, a copyright had an initial duration of 28 years, and it could obtain a renewal term of an additional 28 years only if a renewal registration was made during the final year of the initial term. Former 17 U.S.C. §23 (1909; renumbered §24 in 1947; repealed 1978). The renewal term for pre-1978 works was extended to 47 years in 1976, for a maximum duration of 75 years from first publication. See 17 U.S.C. §304(a), §304(b), as enacted in P.L. 94–553, Title I, §101, 90 Stat. 2573–74 (1976). The renewal term for such works was further extended to 67 years in 1998, for a maximum duration of 95 years from first publication. See 17 U.S.C. §304(a), §304(b) (as amended).
Copyright Protection for Works of Foreign Origin

The Ninth Circuit held that, under the doctrine of territoriality, notice was not required when a work was first published abroad, and therefore “the 1923 publication of Bambi in Germany did not put Bambi in the public domain in the United States...[and] did not preclude the author from subsequently obtaining copyright protection in the United States by complying with the 1909 Copyright Act.”

The Ninth Circuit's holding in Twin Books is internally inconsistent. If during 1923–1926, “anyone could have sold the Bambi book in the United States or made some derivative movie of the Bambi book, and the author Salten would have had no recourse under the United States copyright law.”

During 1923, 1924, and 1925, anyone could have sold the Bambi book in the United States or made some derivative movie of the Bambi book, and the author Salten would have had no recourse under the United States copyright law.

The Ninth Circuit's holding in Twin Books is internally inconsistent. If during 1923–1926, “anyone could have sold the Bambi book in the United States,” then the book had lost its common-law copyright when it was first published in Germany, and if it did not simultaneously obtain a federal statutory copyright, it was therefore in the public domain in the United States. But earlier in its opinion, the Ninth Circuit expressly held that the book was not in the public domain, probably because the public domain had traditionally been considered to be irrevocable. Instead, the court held that a U.S. copyright arose upon publication with notice in 1926, even though the common-law copyright in the work had expired three years earlier. The Ninth Circuit also miscalculated that case as holding that “publication abroad with no notice or with an erroneous notice would not preclude subsequently obtaining a valid United States copyright.” That is not what Heim held; instead, Heim held that a valid United States copyright arose upon publication abroad with no notice.
or with an erroneous notice. Yet two pages later, the Twin Books court states: "Disney cites no authority, nor could it, for the proposition that publication abroad without notice of copyright secures protection under the 1909 Act." The authority that so holds is Heim, which Twin Books purported to rely on.

The result reached in Twin Books would have made more sense if the court had held instead that publication in a foreign country simply didn’t count at all for purposes of common-law copyright (even though that conclusion would have contradicted a century of precedent). If the court had so ruled, then during 1923–1926, the work would still have been protected in the United States under common-law copyright as an unpublished work (that is, as a work unpublished in the United States), and then the work would have validly obtained a federal statutory copyright when it was published with notice in a country with whom the U.S. had treaty relations.

Alternatively, the Twin Books court could have relied on copyright restoration. Effective January 1, 1996, in accordance with Art. 18 of the Berne Convention, Congress restored the copyrights in works of foreign origin that had entered the public domain in the United States for failure to comply with formalities, such as notice and renewal, but had not yet entered the public domain in their source countries. Had the court taken this copyright restoration statute into account, it could have found that the copyright in Bambi commenced in 1923, under Heim; and that Bambi had lost its U.S. copyright in 1951, when Salten’s heir failed to file a renewal; but that Bambi had its U.S. copyright restored in 1996. Alternatively, it could have held that Bambi had been placed in the public domain in 1923 when it was published without notice, but that it had its U.S. copyright restored in 1996. In either case, however, Disney would have been treated as a “reliance party” and would have been entitled to continue exploiting

94 Heim, 154 F.2d at 486–87; id. at 488 (Clark, J., concurring).
95 Twin Books, 83 F.3d at 1168.
96 See also 1 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 73, §4.01[C][1], at 4–8 n. 35.11.
97 See note 48, supra; see also Carte v. Duff (The Mikado Case), 25 F. 183, 184 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885) ("Common law rights of authors run only to the time of the publication of their manuscripts without their consent. . . . It is immaterial whether the publication be made in one country or another.") (emphasis added).
98 See Twin Books, 83 F.3d at 1168 ("Disney is correct publication in a foreign country with notice of United States copyright secures United States copyright protection.").
100 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1971 Paris Text, Art. 18(1) ("This Convention shall apply to all works which, at the moment of its coming into force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of protection.").
its movie version during the remainder of the copyright term on payment of a reasonable royalty.102

9.5 An Illustrative Case

The incoherence of *Twin Books* becomes all the more apparent when it is applied in a more typical factual setting, one in which publication of the work with notice does not occur until many years later, if at all. That is the situation that arose in *Société Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Beseder, Inc.*,103 a case which involved eleven sculptures created in France between 1913 and 1917 by Pierre August Renoir and Richard Guino.104 The sculptures were first published in 1917 in France as works of Renoir;105 and they were republished in France in 1974 and in 1983 as works of Renoir and Guino.106 The works were registered in the United States in 1984;107 but there was no evidence that the works had ever been published with authorization in the United States. When the defendants reproduced the sculptures and advertised them for sale at their art gallery in Arizona, the plaintiffs sued for copyright infringement.108

This case starkly demonstrates the differences between the *Heim* and *Twin Books* approaches to the formality of notice under the 1909 Act. If *Heim* is correct, then the sculptures obtained a U.S. statutory copyright no later than 1917, when the sculptures were first published in France, a country with whom the U.S. had reciprocal copyright relations.109 Those copyrights would have expired 28 years later, in 1945, when no renewals were filed for in the United States.110 When the 1976 Act came into effect, the works would have been in the public domain, and they would have been

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104 Id. at 946 & n. 3 (listing the eleven sculptures).

105 Id. at 946.

106 Id. The opinion is a little unclear on this point. It states that “[t]he sculptures were published as Renoir-Guino works in 1974, in an exhibition for sale held at the Bristol Hotel in Paris, France.” Id. Later, however, it states that “the sculptures were not first published as Renoir-Guino works until 1983.” Id.

107 Id. (“Plaintiff registered the copyright to the sculptures with the Copyright Office in the United States on June 11, 1984.”).

108 Id.


110 See former 17 U.S.C. §23 (1909, renumbered §24 in 1947, repealed 1978) (author or his heirs are entitled to renewal only “when application for such renewal and extension shall have made to the copyright office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright.”).
ineligible for further copyright protection.\textsuperscript{111} Even assuming hypothetically that renewals had been made, the copyrights would have been remained valid for another 28 years until 1973. All such subsisting copyrights were extended temporarily pending the enactment of the 1976 Act,\textsuperscript{112} when 19 years were added to the renewal term.\textsuperscript{113} The copyrights would therefore have expired at the end of 1992,\textsuperscript{114} placing the works in the public domain, and rendering them ineligible for either the 1996 restoration of copyright for works of foreign origin\textsuperscript{115} or the 1998 term extension.\textsuperscript{116} Under \textit{Twin Books}, however, the 1917 publication of the sculptures in France did not place the works in the public domain, nor did it secure a federal statutory copyright. Thus, when the 1976 Act came into effect, the sculptures would have been eligible for protection under section 303, as works “created before January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the public domain or copyrighted.”\textsuperscript{117} Under this section the works are entitled to the copyright term given to new works, life of the longest-surviving author plus 70 years, subject to a statutory minimum.\textsuperscript{118} Since Guino died in 1973, the copyrights would endure until the end of 2043.\textsuperscript{119} However, since the works were “published on or before December 31, 2002,” the statutory minimum

\textsuperscript{111} See P.L. 94–553, Title I, §103, 90 Stat. 2599 (1976) (“This Act does not provide copyright protection for any work that goes into the public domain before January 1, 1978.”).


\textsuperscript{113} See former §304(b), as enacted by P.L. 94–553, Title I, §101, 90 Stat. 2574 (1976) (“The duration of any copyright, the renewal term of which is subsisting at any time between December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, inclusive, . . . is extended to endure for a term of seventy-five years from the date copyright was originally secured.”); see also id. §102, 90 Stat. 2598–99 (providing that §304(b) “take[s] effect upon enactment of this Act.”).

\textsuperscript{114} See 17 U.S.C. §305 (“All terms of copyright provided by sections 302 through 304 run to the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise expire.”).

\textsuperscript{115} See 17 U.S.C. §104A(h)(6)(C) (restoration applies only if the work is in the public domain for one of the specified reasons, not including expiration of maximum period of duration); see also 17 U.S.C. §104A(a)(a)(B) (“Any work in which copyright is restored under this section shall subsist for the remainder of the term of copyright that the work would have otherwise been granted in the United States if the work had never entered the public domain in the United States.”).

\textsuperscript{116} See 17 U.S.C. §304(b) (as amended) (“Any copyright in its renewal term at the time that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act become effective shall have a copyright term of 95 years from the date copyright was originally secured.”) (emphasis added). The CTEA became effective on Oct. 27, 1998, see P.L. 105–298, §106, 112 Stat. 2829, so any works already in the public domain at that time did not have their copyrights extended.

\textsuperscript{117} 17 U.S.C. §303(a). As an aside, it is clear that Congress intended for §303 to apply only to unpublished works. See notes 126–30, infra. It is only the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous holding that publication without notice abroad neither placed the work in the public domain nor invested it with statutory copyright that allows such works to fall within the literal language of § 303.

\textsuperscript{118} See 17 U.S.C. § 303(a).

\textsuperscript{119} See Société Civile Succession Richard Guino, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 952.
Copyright Protection for Works of Foreign Origin

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term provides that “the term of copyright shall not expire before December 31, 2047.”

Thus, application of Heim would result in the copyright having expired in 1945 (or 1992, if hypothetically renewed), and being ineligible for copyright restoration; whereas application of Twin Books would result in the copyright enduring to the end of 2047, a difference of over 100 years! Not surprisingly, although the district court was located in the Ninth Circuit and was bound to follow Twin Books, it did criticize Twin Books in its opinion, expressing the view that it had been decided incorrectly.

But it is not as simple a matter as choosing between these two alternatives, because there are two additional possibilities that must be considered (although in this case, they lead to the same two results). First, under the Copyright Office’s interpretation of the 1909 Act, publication without notice in France in 1917 placed the works in the public domain, instead of investing them with a federal statutory copyright. Again, however, the works would have been ineligible for copyright restoration in 1996, because the term they otherwise would have enjoyed but for the notice and renewal requirements would have expired in 1992. Alternatively, one could take the (historically incorrect) view that foreign publication simply did not count as a “publication” at all for purposes of divesting a work of its common-law copyright. If that was the case, then the work was neither “in the public domain [n]or copyrighted” on January 1, 1978, and section 303 would again be applicable, resulting in a valid copyright (under the statutory minimum) through the end of 2047.

So which of these four interpretations of the 1909 Act is correct? The statute is ambiguous, and the legislative history is unclear, leaving us to rely primarily on policy arguments for making our decision.

The least likely interpretation is the one expressed in Twin Books, for three reasons. First, no court before or since has suggested that a work could be freely copied in the United States (having lost its common-law copyright by virtue of publication without notice abroad), but somehow not be in the public domain in the United States, and instead be in some sort of copyright limbo from which it could obtain a federal statutory copyright by subsequent publication with notice.

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120 17 U.S.C. §303(a). Recall that the court found that the works had been published in 1983. See note 106 and accompanying text, supra. The court and the litigants apparently overlooked the effect of this publication in making the works eligible for the statutory minimum term.


122 See notes 69–74 and accompanying text, supra.


125 The one case that reached a similar result, Italian Book Co. v. Cardilli, 273 F. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1918), was apparently predicated on the view that under the 1909 Act (unlike under previous Acts), a work’s common-law copyright was not lost by foreign publication without notice. Id. at 620.
islative history of the 1976 Act that section 303 was intended to apply only to works which were unpublished on January 1, 1978.126 The phrase “not in the public domain or copyrighted” was intended to exclude all published works, which either had been published with notice (and were therefore “copyrighted”)127 or had been published without notice (and were therefore in the public domain).128 It was also intended to exclude those few unpublished works which had nonetheless been registered under the 1909 Act (and were therefore “copyrighted”).129 The notion that there were works which had been published, but which were neither in the public domain nor copyrighted, simply did not exist in the minds of the legislature.130 Third, as the district court noted in the Guino case, Congress intended the 1996 copyright restoration to apply to works of foreign origin which were in the public domain in the United States for failure to comply with formalities (such as copyright notice).131 If Twin Books is correct, however, many fewer works would have needed copyright restoration, because works of foreign origin never published in the United States would not have entered the public domain in the United States in the first place.132

Under that view, however, the work could not have been freely copied in the United States prior to its re-publication in the United States, since it still would have been subject to common-law copyright.126 The House Report stated that the purpose of §303 was “to substitute statutory for common law copyright for everything now protected at common law.” H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 139 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5755. But as indicated above, common-law copyright only applied to unpublished works, and publication anywhere in the world divested a work of its common-law copyright. See notes 44–49 and accompanying text.

127 See former 17 U.S.C. §9 (1909, renumbered §10 in 1947, repealed 1978) (“any person entitled thereto by this Act may secure copyright for his work by publication of notice thereof with the notice of copyright required by this Act.”).

128 See notes 45–48 and accompanying text, supra.

129 See former 17 U.S.C. §11 (1909, renumbered §12 in 1947, repealed 1978) (“copyright may also be had of the works of an author, of which copies are not reproduced for sale, by the deposit, with claim of copyright, of one complete copy of such work.”).

130 Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 129, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5745 (“Instead of a dual system of ‘common-law copyright’ for unpublished works and statutory copyright for published works, which has been the system in effect in the United States since the first copyright statute in 1790, the bill adopts a single system of Federal statutory copyright from creation….Common law copyright protection for works coming within the scope of the statute would be abrogated, and the concept of publication would lose its all-embracing importance as the dividing line between common law and statutory protection and between both of these forms of legal protection and the public domain.”) (emphasis added).

131 See 17 U.S.C. §104A(h)(6)(C)(i); Société Civile Succession Richard Guino, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 950–51 (“The Twin Books rule would prevent a foreign work published without notice from being eligible for copyright restoration under §104A, which expressly provides copyright restoration for foreign works published without notice of copyright.”).

132 See Société Civile Succession Richard Guino, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 951 (“A prerequisite to restoration under §104A is that a work is in the public domain, for enumerated reasons, in the United States….The Twin Books rule provides that a work published in a foreign country without
It is also unlikely that Congress intended that publication without notice abroad simply would not count for purposes of common-law copyright. Although this alternative avoids the first two of the problems identified for Twin Books, it does not avoid the third; many fewer works would have needed copyright restoration if this rule had been in effect. In addition, as noted above, this alternative contradicts some 100 years of precedent that held that common-law copyright was divested by any publication, either here or abroad, and it also requires that a court treat publication abroad in two different ways, depending on whether notice was used or not. Publication with notice would count as a “publication,” but publication without notice would not.

The Heim rule has some merit, in that it is at least arguably consistent with the ambiguous language of the statute. The 1909 Act stated that copyright protection is secured “by publication thereof with the notice required by this title,” but since “this title” only required notice on copies of the work published in the United States, arguably works first published abroad without any notice were published “with the notice required by this title.” Again, however, if one could secure a U.S. copyright by publishing abroad without notice, fewer works would have needed to have their copyrights restored in 1996, because they already would have had a copyright (if properly renewed). In addition, any third parties that began exploiting such works without permission before 1996 would not be treated as reliance parties, because the works technically would have been “subject to copyright protection” and would not have been in the public domain.

Copyright notice is not in the public domain in the United States, unduly preventing copyright restoration of such work); 1 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 73, §4.01[C][1] at 4–9 to 4–10.1. 133 See notes 45 & 48, supra. 134 Former 17 U.S.C. §9 (1909; renumbered §10 in 1947, repealed 1978). As enacted, this section used the word “Act” instead of the word “title”; the word “title” was substituted when the statute was codified and renumbered in 1947. 135 This is the interpretation advocated by Nimmer. See 2 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 73, §7.12[D][2][a] at 7–103 to 7–104. 136 See Vincent A. Doyle, George D. Cary, Marjorie McCannon & Barbara Ringer, Copyright Law Revision Study No. 7, Notice of Copyright 14 (1957) (“the doctrine of the Heim case would mean that the bulk of works by foreign authors first published abroad are effectively protected under U.S. copyright law without the observance of any formalities.”). 137 Admittedly, the formality of renewal would have caused most of these works to enter the public domain at the end of their initial 28-year term, since only those copyright owners who were aware of the Heim decision would have bothered to apply for renewal of copyright in their works. These works would therefore benefit from copyright restoration. This fact makes the Heim approach clearly the second-best alternative in terms of making copyright restoration meaningful. 138 See 17 U.S.C. §104A(h)(4)(A) (defining “reliance party” as “any person who...with respect to a particular work, engages in acts, before the source country of that work becomes an eligible country, which would have violated section 106 if the restored work had been subject to copyright protection, and who, after the source country becomes an eligible country, continues to engage in such acts.”).
they would simply be longstanding (but newly discovered) infringers. Finally, one must admit that it is a strange reading of the statute to say that publication without any notice at all is the equivalent of publication “with the notice required by this title.”

That leaves us with the fourth alternative: that initial publication without notice in a foreign country placed the work in the public domain in the United States, even though it would not have done so if the work had previously been published with notice. This solution is consistent with the language of the statute; and unlike Heim, it is also consistent with the regulation adopted by the U.S. Copyright Office in 1959 and still in effect today. It is subject to the criticism that it would be pointless to require only that the initial copy sold abroad bear notice; but as a practical matter, that would be unlikely to happen. If the foreign author or publisher wanted to secure a U.S. copyright without publishing the work in the United States, it is more likely that the entire first edition sold abroad would have a copyright notice, even if subsequent editions did not. And since the 1909 Act had a manufacturing clause, requiring that deposit copies be printed from type set in the United States, it is likely that Congress envisioned (or desired) that most works would be published domestically first, or else that they would simultaneously be published in the United States and abroad, in order to secure United States copyright protection. Finally, those works which were first published abroad without notice would still be eligible for the copyright restoration enacted by Congress in 1994 (effective January 1, 2001).
This solution would also allow parties who began exploiting such works before 1996 to be treated as reliance parties under the copyright restoration statute.

It should be noted that, because of copyright restoration, the last two alternatives will today always reach the same results in terms of validity and expiration of the copyright. The only meaningful difference between them is that the Copyright Office’s interpretation would allow third parties who began exploiting such works before 1996, and which continue to do so today, to be treated as reliance parties under the statute; whereas under the Heim approach, there can be no reliance parties for those few works which were registered under the “rule of doubt” and were subsequently renewed.

9.6 Conclusion

Copyright practitioners should be dismayed that an important question of interpretation of the 1909 Act is still unresolved nearly 100 years after its enactment, and that choosing the proper interpretation will still be a material issue for another 65 years in the future. Indeed, anyone who believes that laws should be clear and consistent and easily applied should be appalled by this state of affairs. Copyright scholars have already noted the difficulty of determining whether a given work is in the public domain; when the work was first published abroad without notice, the difficulties are insurmountable.

While I believe that the solution outlined above is the correct one, it is perhaps even more important that a single solution be agreed upon, so that copyright owners and users in different parts of the country are not tempted to shop for a favorable forum in which to obtain the result they desire. Thus, if the Guino case is appealed, the Ninth Circuit should take the case en banc and overturn its nonsensical decision in Twin Books. The court should then either adopt the reasoning in Heim, harmonizing its law with the plausible but second-best interpretation of the Second Circuit; or it should adopt the correct solution outlined above, leaving it to the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari and decide the question once and for all.

148 For another example demonstrating these difficulties, see Elizabeth Townsend Gard, Vera Brittain, Section 104(a) and Section 104A: A Case Study in Sorting Out the Duration of Foreign Works Under the 1976 Copyright Act, Tulane Public Law Research Paper No. 07–09 (draft), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015575 (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).