n7 We are unpersuaded by petitioner's argument that the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code codified the Durrett Rule. Those amendments expanded the definition of "transfer" to include "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption," 11 U.S.C.  101(54) (1988 ed., Supp. IV), and added the words "voluntarily or involuntarily" as modifiers of the term "transfer" in   548(a). The first of these provisions establishes that foreclosure sales fall within the general definition of "transfers" that may be avoided under several statutory provisions, including (but not limited to)  548. See  522(h) (transfers of exempt property),  544 (transfers voidable under state law),  547 (preferential transfers),  549 (postpetition transfers). The second of them establishes that a transfer may be avoided as fraudulent even if it was against the debtor's will. See In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CA9 1984) (pre-amendment decision holding that a foreclosure sale is not a "transfer" under  548). Neither of these consequences has any bearing upon the meaning of "reasonably equivalent value" in the context of a foreclosure sale.
Nor does our reading render these amendments "superfluous," as the dissent contends, post, at 8. Prior to 1984, it was at least open to question whether  548 could be used to invalidate even a collusive foreclosure sale, see Madrid, 725 F.2d, at 1204 (Farris, J., concurring). It is no superfluity for Congress to clarify what had been at best unclear, which is what it did here by making the provision apply to involuntary as well as voluntary transfers and by including foreclosures within the definition of "transfer." See infra, at 14-15.