n5 We are baffled by the dissent's perception of a "patent" difference between zoning and foreclosure laws insofar as impact upon property value is concerned, post, at 10-11, n. 10. The only distinction we perceive is that the former constitute permanent restrictions upon use of the subject property, while the latter apply for a brief period of time and restrict only the manner of its sale. This difference says nothing about how significantly the respective regimes affect the property's value when they are operative. The dissent characterizes foreclosure rules as "merely procedural," and asserts that this renders them, unlike "substantive" zoning regulations, irrelevant in bankruptcy. We are not sure we agree with the characterization. But in any event, the cases relied on for this distinction all address creditors' attempts to claim the benefit of state rules of law (whether procedural or substantive) as property rights, in a bankruptcy proceeding. See United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 370-371, 98 L. Ed. 2d 740, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 313, 114 L. Ed. 2d 350, 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 206-207, 76 L. Ed. 2d 515, 103 S. Ct. 2309, and nn. 14, 15 (1983). None of them declares or even intimates that state laws, procedural or otherwise, are irrelevant to prebankruptcy valuation questions such as that presented by  548(a)(2)(A).