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Marvin v. Marvin
18 Cal. 3d 660 (Cal. 1976)
Tobriner, J.
During the past 15 years, there has been a substantial increase in the
number of couples living together without marrying. Such nonmarital relationships lead to
legal controversy when one partner dies or the couple separates. Courts of Appeal, faced
with the task of determining property rights in such cases, have arrived at conflicting
positions: two cases have held that the Family Law Act requires division of the property
according to community property principles, and one decision has
rejected that holding. We take this opportunity to resolve that controversy and to declare
the principles which should govern distribution of property acquired in a nonmarital
relationship.
We conclude: (1) The provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the
distribution of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship; such a relationship
remains subject solely to judicial decision. (2) The courts should enforce express
contracts between nonmarital partners except to the extent that the contract is explicitly
founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services. (3) In the absence of an
express contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine
whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint
venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may also employ
the doctrine of quantum meruit, or equitable
remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts, when warranted by the facts of the
case.
In the instant case plaintiff and defendant lived together for seven years without marrying; all property acquired during this period was taken in defendant's name. When plaintiff sued to enforce a contract under which she was entitled to half the property and to support payments, the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for defendant, thus leaving him with all property accumulated by the couple during their relationship. Since the trial court denied plaintiff a trial on the merits of her claim, its decision conflicts with the principles stated above, and must be reversed.
1. The factual setting of this appeal.
Since the trial court rendered judgment for defendant on the pleadings, we must accept the allegations of plaintiff's complaint as true, determining whether such allegations state, or can be amended to state, a cause of action. We turn therefore to the specific allegations of the complaint.
Plaintiff avers that in October of
1964 she and defendant "entered into an oral agreement" that while "the
parties lived together they would combine their efforts and earnings and would share
equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual
or combined." Furthermore, they agreed to "hold themselves out to the general
public as husband and wife" and that "plaintiff would further render her
services as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook to . . .defendant."
Shortly thereafter plaintiff agreed to "give up her lucrative
career as an entertainer [and] singer" in order to "devote her full time to
defendant . . . as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook;" in return defendant
agreed to "provide for all of plaintiff's financial support and needs for the rest of
her life."
Plaintiff alleges that she lived with defendant from October of 1964
through May of 1970 and fulfilled her obligations under the agreement. During this period
the parties as a result of their efforts and earnings acquired in defendant's name
substantial real and personal property, including motion picture rights worth over $1
million. In May of 1970, however, defendant compelled plaintiff to leave his household. He
continued to support plaintiff until November of 1971, but thereafter refused to provide
further support.
On the basis of these allegations plaintiff asserts two causes of
action. The first, for declaratory relief, asks the court to determine her contract and
property rights; the second seeks to impose a constructive trust upon one half of the
property acquired during the course of the relationship.
Defendant demurred unsuccessfully, and then answered the complaint.
Following extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings, the case came to
trial. Defendant renewed his attack on the complaint by a motion to dismiss. Since
the parties had stipulated that defendant's marriage to Betty Marvin did not terminate
until the filing of a final decree of divorce in January 1967, the trial court treated
defendant's motion as one for judgment on the pleadings augmented by the stipulation.
After hearing argument the court granted defendant's motion and entered
judgment for defendant. Plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment and asked leave to amend
her complaint to allege that she and defendant reaffirmed their agreement after
defendant's divorce was final. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion, and she appealed
from the judgment.
2. Plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action for breach of an
express contract.
In Trutalli v. Meraviglia (1932) 215 Cal. 698 [12 P.2d 430] we
established the principle that nonmarital partners may lawfully contract concerning the
ownership of property acquired during the relationship. We reaffirmed this principle in
Vallera v. Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681, 685 [134 P.2d 761], stating that "If a man
and woman [who are not married] live together as husband and wife under an agreement to
pool their earnings and share equally in their joint accumulations, equity will protect
the interests of each in such property."
In the case before us plaintiff, basing her cause of action in contract
upon these precedents, maintains that the trial court erred in denying her a trial on the
merits of her contention. Although that court did not specify the ground for its
conclusion that plaintiff's contractual allegations stated no cause of action, defendant
offers some four theories to sustain the ruling; we proceed to examine them.
Defendant first and principally relies on the contention that the
alleged contract is so closely related to the supposed "immoral" character of
the relationship between plaintiff and himself that the enforcement of the contract would
violate public policy. He points to cases asserting that a contract between nonmarital
partners is unenforceable if it is "involved in" an illicit relationship, or
made in "contemplation" of such a relationship. A review of the numerous
California decisions concerning contracts between nonmarital partners, however, reveals
that the courts have not employed such broad and uncertain standards to strike down
contracts. The decisions instead disclose a narrower and more precise standard: a contract
between nonmarital partners is unenforceable only to the extent that it explicitly rests
upon the immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services.
. . .
Although the past decisions hover over the issue in the somewhat wispy
form of the figures of a Chagall painting, we can abstract from those decisions a clear
and simple rule. The fact that a man and woman live together without marriage, and engage
in a sexual relationship, does not in itself invalidate agreements between them relating
to their earnings, property, or expenses. Neither is such an agreement invalid merely
because the parties may have contemplated the creation or continuation of a nonmarital
relationship when they entered into it. Agreements between nonmarital partners fail only
to the extent that they rest upon a consideration of meretricious sexual services. Thus
the rule asserted by defendant, that a contract fails if it is "involved in" or
made "in contemplation" of a nonmarital relationship, cannot be reconciled with
the decisions.
. . .
The decisions . . . thus demonstrate that a contract between nonmarital
partners, even if expressly made in contemplation of a common living arrangement, is
invalid only if sexual acts form an inseparable part of the consideration for the
agreement. In sum, a court will not enforce a contract for the pooling of property and
earnings if it is explicitly and inseparably based upon services as a paramour. The Court
of Appeal opinion in Hill, however, indicates that even if sexual services are part of the
contractual consideration, any severable portion of the contract supported by independent
consideration will still be enforced.
. . . [I omit the court's discussion and rejection of defendant's
other theories that the express agreement was invalid.]
In summary, we base our opinion on the principle that adults who
voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as
any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights. Of course,
they cannot lawfully contract to pay for the performance of sexual services, for such a
contract is, in essence, an agreement for prostitution and unlawful for that reason. But
they may agree to pool their earnings and to hold all property acquired during the
relationship in accord with the law governing community property; conversely they may
agree that each partner's earnings and the property acquired from those earnings remains
the separate property of the earning partner. So long as the agreement does not rest
upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may order their economic affairs as
they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from enforcing such agreements.
In the present instance, plaintiff alleges that the parties agreed to
pool their earnings, that they contracted to share equally in all property acquired, and
that defendant agreed to support plaintiff. The terms of the contract as alleged do not
rest upon any unlawful consideration. We therefore conclude that the complaint furnishes a
suitable basis upon which the trial court can render declaratory relief. The trial
court consequently erred in granting defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
3. Plaintiff's complaint can be amended to state a cause of action
founded upon theories of implied contract or equitable relief.
As we have noted, both causes of action in plaintiff's complaint allege
an express contract; neither assert any basis for relief independent from the contract. In
In re Marriage of Cary, supra, 34 Cal.App.3d 345, however, the Court of Appeal held that,
in view of the policy of the Family Law Act, property accumulated by nonmarital partners
in an actual family relationship should be divided equally. Upon examining the Cary
opinion, the parties to the present case realized that plaintiff's alleged relationship
with defendant might arguably support a cause of action independent of any express
contract between the parties. The parties have therefore briefed and discussed the issue
of the property rights of a nonmarital partner in the absence of an express contract.
Although our conclusion that plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action based on an
express contract alone compels us to reverse the judgment for defendant, resolution of the
Cary issue will serve both to guide the parties upon retrial and to resolve a conflict
presently manifest in published Court of Appeal decisions.
. . . [With the exception of footnotes 11
and 16, I omit the court's extensive discussion of prior
cases concerning the division of property between separated nonmarital partners in the
absence of express agreement.]
In summary, we believe that the prevalence of nonmarital
relationships in modern society and the social acceptance of them, marks this as a time
when our courts should by no means apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the so-called
meretricious relationship to the instant case. As we have explained, the nonenforceability
of agreements expressly providing for meretricious conduct rested upon the fact that such
conduct, as the word suggests, pertained to and encompassed prostitution. To equate the
nonmarital relationship of today to such a subject matter is to do violence to an accepted
and wholly different practice.
We are aware that many young couples live together without the
solemnization of marriage, in order to make sure that they can successfully later
undertake marriage. This trial period, preliminary to marriage, serves as some assurance
that the marriage will not subsequently end in dissolution to the harm of both parties. We
are aware, as we have stated, of the pervasiveness of nonmarital relationships in other
situations.
The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to
cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that
have apparently been so widely abandoned by so many. Lest we be misunderstood, however, we
take this occasion to point out that the structure of society itself largely depends upon
the institution of marriage, and nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken to
derogate from that institution. The joining of the man and woman in marriage is at once
the most socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy
in the course of a lifetime.
We conclude that the judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a
policy based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the parties to a
nonmarital relationship should be removed. As we have explained, the courts now hold that
express agreements will be enforced unless they rest on an unlawful meretricious
consideration. We add that in the absence of an express agreement, the courts may look to
a variety of other remedies in order to protect the parties' lawful expectations. n24
The courts may inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine
whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership
or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties. The courts
may, when appropriate, employ principles of constructive trust
or resulting trust. Finally, a nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit for
the reasonable value of household services rendered less the reasonable value of support
received if he can show that he rendered services with the expectation of monetary reward.
Since we have determined that plaintiff's complaint states a cause of
action for breach of an express contract, and, as we have explained, can be amended to
state a cause of action independent of allegations of express contract, we must conclude
that the trial court erred in granting defendant a judgment on the pleadings.
The judgment is reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
Clark, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
The majority opinion properly permit recovery on the basis of either
express or implied in fact agreement between the parties. These being the issues
presented, their resolution requires reversal of the judgment. Here, the opinion
should stop.
This court should not attempt to determine all anticipated rights,
duties and remedies within every meretricious relationship -- particularly in vague terms.
Rather, these complex issues should be determined as each arises in a concrete case.
The majority broadly indicate that a party to a meretricious
relationship may recover on the basis of equitable principles and in quantum meruit.
However, the majority fail to advise us of the circumstances permitting recovery,
limitations on recovery, or whether their numerous remedies are cumulative or exclusive.
Conceivably, under the majority opinion a party may recover half of the property acquired
during the relationship on the basis of general equitable principles, recover a bonus
based on specific equitable considerations, and recover a second bonus in quantum meruit.
The general sweep of the majority opinion raises but fails to answer
several questions. First, because the Legislature specifically excluded some parties to a
meretricious relationship from the equal division rule of Civil Code section 4452, is this
court now free to create an equal division rule? Second, upon termination of the
relationship, is it equitable to impose the economic obligations of lawful spouses on
meretricious parties when the latter may have rejected matrimony to avoid such
obligations? Third, does not application of equitable principles -- necessitating
examination of the conduct of the parties -- violate the spirit of the Family Law Act of
1969, designed to eliminate the bitterness and acrimony resulting from the former fault
system in divorce? Fourth, will not application of equitable principles reimpose upon
trial courts the unmanageable burden of arbitrating domestic disputes? Fifth, will not a
quantum meruit system of compensation for services -- discounted by benefits received --
place meretricious spouses in a better position than lawful spouses? Sixth, if a quantum
meruit system is to be allowed, does fairness not require inclusion of all services and
all benefits regardless of how difficult the evaluation?
When the parties to a meretricious relationship show by express or
implied in fact agreement they intend to create mutual obligations, the courts should
enforce the agreement. However, in the absence of agreement, we should stop and consider
the ramifications before creating economic obligations which may violate legislative
intent, contravene the intention of the parties, and surely generate undue burdens on our
trial courts.
By judicial overreach, the majority perform a nunc pro tunc marriage,
dissolve it, and distribute its property on terms never contemplated by the parties, case
law or the Legislature.
* * * *
[On the question of whether a court should permit separated
nonmarital partners to claim property based upon an implied in fact contract, the New York
Court of Appeals disagreed with the California Supreme Court. Here is an excerpt
from the New York Court of Appeals decision in Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 429
N.HY.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. Court of Appeals, 1980):
"[W]e . . . have declined to recognize a contract which is implied
from the rendition and acceptance of services. The major difficulty with implying a
contract from the rendition of services for one another by persons living together is that
it is not reasonable to infer an agreement to pay for the services rendered when the
relationship of the parties makes it natural that the services were rendered
gratuitously. As a matter of human experience personal services will frequently be
rendered by two people living together because they value each other's company or because
they find it a convenient or rewarding thing to do. For courts to attempt through
hindsight to sort out the intentions of the parties and affix jural significance to
conduct carried out within an essentially private and generally noncontractual
relationship runs too great a risk of error. Absent an express agreement, there is
no frame of reference against which to compare the testimony presented and the character
of the evidence that can be presented becomes more evanescent. There is, therefore,
substantially greater risk of emotion-laden afterthought, not to mention fraud, in
attempting to ascertain by implication what services, if any, were rendered gratuitously
and what compensation, if any, the parties intended to be paid."]