Problem.Enforceability of security interest

     A.  Tran Njo visited Bobby Fisher's Pawnshop in hopes of borrowing $5,000 to help with her sister's emergency medical expenses. Ms. Njo brought her wedding band to offer as collateral. Bobby agreed to lend Ms. Njo the $5,000 if she would leave the wedding band as collateral and if she would also bring in her husband's wedding band as additional collateral. Her husband was out of the country for a few days and she needed the money immediately. After considering her plight, Bobby advanced the $5,000 immediately, took possession of Ms. Njo's wedding ring, and insisted that Ms. Njo bring in her husband's wedding band within one week. Before leaving, Ms. Njo signed a promissory note that reflected terms of repayment but did not refer to security for the debt. No other record concerning the transaction was prepared.  Does Fisher have an enforceable security interest in Ms. Njo's wedding band?  See U.C.C. 9-203(b).  

     B.  Suppose that Ms. Njo stole her neighbor's wedding band and delivered it to Bobby Fisher as if it were the wedding band of Ms. Njo's husband.  Does Bobby have an enforceable security interest in the stolen wedding band?  See U.C.C. 9-203(b)(3); 9-102(a)(28); 9-102(a)(59). 

     C.  Mr. and Ms. Njo live in California, a community property state.  Suppose that Mr. Njo rather than Ms. Njo approached Bobby Fisher for a loan.  Without his wife's permission, Mr. Njo delivered his wife's mink coat (acquired after marriage and hence community property in a community property state) as collateral for the loan.  Does Bobby have an enforceable security interest in the mink coat?  Consider Cal. Fam. Code 1100 that provides, in part, that (a) . . . "either spouse has the management and control of the community personal property . . .  with like absolute power of disposition . . .  as the spouse has of the separate estate of the spouse;" and (c) "[however] [a] spouse may not . . .  encumber . . . the clothing or wearing apparel of the other spouse which is community property . . . without the written consent of the other spouse."  Also consider U.C.C. 9-201(b), (c).  The bracketed language in U.C.C. 9-201(b) (and elsewhere in Article 9) is an instruction from drafters of Article 9 to state legislatures; it is not part of the statutory language.      

     D.  Reconsider the facts stated in Part A, above.   Assume that the husband's wedding band is his separate property.  Suppose that Mr. Njo consented to use of his wedding band as collateral but neither Mr. nor Ms. Njo delivered the wedding band to Bobby Fisher (they forgot because of preoccupation with the sister's medical problems).  However, Bobby did not pursue the matter until six months later when Ms. Njo defaulted on her payments. Is Bobby entitled to claim Mr. Njo's wedding band as additional collateral for the debt?  Would it make any difference if, immediately after getting her husband's consent, Ms. Njo sent e-mail to Bobby Fisher that stated:  "As additional collateral, my husband will bring the wedding band in shortly"?  Would it matter that Ms. Njo didn't type her name on the e-mail but the e-mail program, based on her prior programming, automatically added her name to the bottom of the message?  What if, instead of Ms. Njo's e-mail, the husband wrote an e-mail to Bobby Fisher, with his electronic signature, stating only:  "I'll bring in the wedding band shortly"?

     E.  Suppose that Ms. Njo does not wish to use wedding bands as collateral but does have $7,500 in a credit union account.  If Bobby Fisher is interested, can he take a security interest in the credit union account?  How?   Even if she can withdraw funds from the account?  See U.C.C. 9-203(b)(3)(D), U.C.C. 9-104, U.C.C. 9-102(a)(29), U.C.C. 9-102(a)(8), U.C.C. 9-109(d)(13).  

     F.   If Bobby ultimately recovers $3,000 through the disposition of collateral following default, how would Bobby go about collecting the balance, including accumulated interest (the "deficiency")?