Problem.Self help repossession

     A. Slim Jim Repossessors ("Slim"), hired by a bank, has had a difficult time repossessing a late model Corvette from its owner who parks it only in his locked garage at home or in an enclosed and guarded security area at work. Slim and his employees finally succeeded in repossessing the Corvette in the following manner:   Just before the owner arrived home from work, Slim parked a car blocking access to the owner's driveway. Slim raised the hood and peered underneath, as if he were simply a passing motorist investigating a problem with his car. When the owner of the Corvette arrived and got out of the Corvette to inquire or offer assistance, one of Slim's employees who had been hiding behind a tree furtively slipped into the Corvette and, as he drove away, smiled at the protesting owner.  (In the words of humorist Dave Barry: "I didn't make this up.")  Has Slim breached the peace? If so, is the bank liable? For how much?  For punitive as well as compensatory damages?  U.C.C. 9-625(b), U.C.C. 9-625(c), and Official Comment 3 to U.C.C. 9-625.  Note that California did not adopt U.C.C. 9-625(c)(2).  

     B.  In connection with the sale of automobiles, some automobile dealers attach to the automobile an electronic device that alerts customers that a payment will soon be due, disables the starting of a car when a payment is overdue, and allows restarting of the car if and when the customer makes the required overdue payment.  For information, including news stories and testimonials, about one such device, see the website of Payment Protection Systems, Inc. Among its users is Mel Farr, former U.C.L.A. and NFL running back, owner of automobile dealership franchises in Michigan and Ohio, who claims to have significantly reduced his default rate through use of such a device.  Is the use of this technology permitted by Article 9?  See U.C.C. 9-601(a), U.C.C. 9-609, U.C.C. 9-102(a)(33), U.C.C. 9-602.  If the device disables the starting of a car when the car is parked in a high crime area, if vandals then damage or strip the car, and if insurance is insufficient to cover the damage, who should bear the risk of the loss in value to the collateral?  Cf. U.C.C. 9-207. 

     C.  You are in-house counsel to a company that designs, manufacturers, and licenses database software to business. Your client asks for your opinion about the wisdom and legality of remote electronic disabling of software upon the licensee's breach of the licensing agreement.   Would your opinion be influenced by the possibility that such disabling might cause serious disruption in the business operations of the defaulting party, including denial of access to, damage to, or destruction of important information stored in the electronic databases of the defaulting party?  Does Article 9 apply?  See U.C.C. 9-109(a) and U.C.C. 1-201(37).   If Article 9 is not applicable, is any language of  U.C.C. 9-609 nonetheless helpful by analogy?  Consider the solutions offered in sections 814-816 of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), a uniform law proposed for adoption in 1999 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  As of 2001, UCITA, which is highly controversial for reasons unrelated to the contents of sections 814-816, had been adopted only in Virginia and Maryland.  Sections 814-816, as adopted and renumbered in Virginia, are reproduced here.  The entire text of UCITA together with its Official Comments, including the Official Comments to sections 814-816, is displayed on a website maintained by the University of Pennsylvania School of Law.  

     D. Wisconsin prohibits self help repossession of motor vehicles until after a court determination that the creditor is entitled to the collateral. Wis. Stat. Ann. 425.203-.206 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). Whitford and Laufer concluded that this approach increased the costs of repossessions, decreased the number of repossessions, and resulted in larger down payments required of purchasers of used cars. Whitford and Laufer, The Impact of Denying self help Repossession of Automobiles: A Case Study of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 1975 Wis.L.Rev. 607. Why not prohibit self help repossession of automobiles (or other collateral?) altogether, as some consumer advocates have urged? Would that significantly alter the terms or availability of credit? If so, would that cost be worth the benefit?  Does the practice of Mel Farr (described in Part B of this Problem) suggest some answers?